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Federal Income T a x a t i o n - D ~ s ~ ~ ~ o w ~ ~ c ~  OF SURTAX EXEMPTION 
TO BROTHER-SISTER CORPORATIONS-STOCK OWNERSHIP TEST 
UNDER SECTIONS 1551 AND 1563-Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., 
Inc. v. Commissioner, [I977 Adv. Sh.] STAND. FED. TAX REP. 
(CCH) (77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 86,250) fi 9163 (4th Cir. Jan. 28,1977), 
rev'g per curium, 65 T.C. 798 (1976). 
William Herbert owned all of the stock of Fairfax Auto Parts, 
Inc. (FAP), and 55 percent of the outstanding stock of Fairfax 
Auto Parts of Northern Virginia, Inc. (NOVA). The remaining 
stock of NOVA was owned by Joseph Ofano. In computing their 
respective tax liabilities for 1971 and 1972, NOVA and FAP each 
used a full surtax exemption of $25,000, pursuant to section l l ( d )  
of the Internal Revenue Code.' The Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue determined that NOVA and FAP were component mem- 
bers of a brother-sister controlled group as defined by section 
1563(a)2 and therefore were entitled to only one surtax exemption. 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to "Code" or "section(s)" refer to the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. 
2. I.R.C. § 1563(a): 
- 
(a) CONTROLLED GROUP OF CORPORATIONS.-For purposes of this part, the 
term "controlled group of corporations" means any group of- 
. . . .  
(2) BROTHER-SISTER CONTROLLED GROUP.-TWO or more corporations if 5 or 
fewer persons who are individuals, estates, or trusts own . . .  stock possessing- 
(A) at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all 
classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value 
of shares of all classes of the stock of each corporation, and 
(B) more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of 
all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than 50 percent of the total 
value of shares of all classes of stock of each corporation, taking into 
account the stock ownership of each such person only to the extent 
such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such corpora- 
tion. 
. , . .  
The application of the 80-percent and 50-percent tests is illustrated in the following 
examples: 
Example (1). If A owns 55% of Corporation Y and 45% of Corporation 2 ,  and B owns 
35% of Y and 40% of 2, the two tests would apply as follows: 
Percentage of Stock Percent of Identical 
Ownership 
Y z 
Ownership 
Shareholder: 
A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Total . . . . . . . . . . .  90 8 5 80 
As the table illustrates, A and B together own 90% of Y and 85% of 2. Thus, the basic 
80-percent ownership test is met. However, since A owns 55% of Y but only 45% of 2, his 
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The Commissioner allocated to each corporation a surtax exemp- 
tion of $12,500 for each taxable year involved and issued a notice 
of deficiency to both NOVA and FAP, based on this allocation. 
NOVA and FAP chose not to pay the deficiencies and insti- 
tuted a proceeding for a redetermination of deficiencies of income 
taxes. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner that the 
ownership pattern of NOVA and FAP fell within the definition 
of brother-sister corporations set forth in Treasury regulation 
section 1.1563-1 (a) (3) ,3 but found the regulation inconsistent with 
the statute and hence invalid. The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap- 
peals reversed per curium, adopting the Tax Court dissenting 
opinion's reasoning4 that the regulation is consistent with section 
1563 and its legislative h i ~ t o r y . ~  
stockholdings in the two are identical only to the extent of 45%. Similarly, B's stockhold- 
ings are identical only to the extent of 35%. Together A and B hold 80% each of Y and Z 
and the 50-percent test is met. Thus, in this example, Y and Z are members of a brother- 
sister controlled group. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS & SENATE COMM. ON 
FINANCE, 9 1 s ~  CONG.,  ST SESS., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS U S .  TREASURY DEP'T, 
pt. 2, a t  245-46 (Comm. Print 1969). 
Example (2). If A owns 80% of Corporation Y and 20% of Corporation Z, and B owns 
20% of Y and 80% of Z, the two tests would apply as follows: 
Percentage of Stock Percentage of Identical 
Ownership Ownership 
Y z 
Shareholder: 
A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Total . . . . . . . .  100 100 40 
As the table illustrates, A and B together own 100% of Y and 100% of Z. Thus, the 
basic 80-percent ownership test is met. However, since A owns 80% of Y but only 20% of 
Z, his stockholdings in the two are identical only to the extent of 20%. Similarly, B's 
stockholdings are identical only to the extent of 20%. Together A and B hold only 40% 
each of Y and 2, and the 50-percent test is not met. Thus, in this example, Y and Z are 
not members of a brother-sister group. 
3. Treas. Reg. 9 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1972). For relevant portions of the text of the Treas- 
ury regulation, see text accompanying note 36 infra. 
4. Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, [I977 Adv. Sh.] STAND. FED. 
TAX REP. (CCH) (77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 86,250) 7 9163 a t  86,250-51 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1977) 
(emphasis added): 
The majority and the dissenting opinions [of the Tax Court] fully set out 
the arguments supporting both interpretations of the statute, and there is no 
need to repeat them here. We conclude that the dissent's interpretation of the 
statute accords with the text of the statute and its legislative history. 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion, we reverse the 
Tax Court [and] uphold the validity of the regulation. 
5. The Fourth Circuit and Tax Court holdings can be illustrated as follows. The 
Commissioner included Joseph Ofano's stock ownership in his determination that FAP 
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A. The Surtax Exemption 
The corporate income tax consists of a normal tax, imposed 
on all taxable income, and a surtax, which is added to the normal 
tax? Section l l (d )  exempts the first $25,000 of a corporation's 
taxable income from the surtax.' Congress enacted this exemp- 
tion in order to assist small businesses by reducing their taxes? 
Under the effect of the exemption, however, large corporations 
were able to obtain a greater tax benefit than were small busi- 
nessesg by restructuring their organizations in order to generate 
and NOVA satisfied the 80-percent and 50-percent tests of § 1563(a)(2). The Commis- 
sioner's determination was upheld by the Fourth Circuit: 
Stock Identical 
Ownership Ownership 
F A P  NOVA 
Shareholder : 
. . . . . . . . . .  Herbert 
Ofano . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Total . . . . . . . . . . . .  100% 100% 55 C/c 
The Tax Court held, however, that since Joseph Ofano held no stock in FAP, his owner- 
ship could not be counted for purposes of the 80-percent test: 
Stock Identical 
Ownership Ownership 
F A P  NOVA 
Shareholder : 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  Herbert 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . .  100% 55 C-/C 55 70 
Since William Herbert did not own at least 80% of NOVA, the stock ownership test is not 
met and FAP and -yOVA are not members of a brother-sister group. 
6. I.R.C. 6 l l(a).  In both 1971 and 1972, the normal and surtax rates were 22% and 
26% respectively. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, $121,78 Stat. 25, as amended, 
I.R.C. Il(b)-(c). 
7. I.R.C. # l l(d).  
8. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1950), reprinted in 1950- 
2 C.B. 380, 401; H.R. REP. NO. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 97 (1960). In 1971 and 
1972, the surtax exemption reduced by $6,500 the tax of each corporate taxpayer with 
taxable income of $25,000 or more. 
9. Hearings on the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 160 (1963) : 
While it is apparent that, in a number of cases, the formation of multiple 
corporations was without regard to tax considerations, other cases indicate a 
strong tax motivation. This is indicated by the wide variation of tax savings 
lOOO] CASE NOTES 
multiple surtax exemptions.1° 
B. Statutory Methods for Dealing with the Abuse 
I .  Section 1551 prior to 1964 
Prior to 1964, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue used 
section 155111 as a weapon against the abuse of forming multiple 
corporations to avoid income tax.12 This section provided that 
both the $25,000 surtax exemption and the accumulated earnings 
credit13 would be denied to any corporation transferring property 
- - -- -- 
obtained from multi-corporate organization. In some instances the savings are 
incidental, while in others they are substantial. Under the present tax structure, 
the groups shown are subject to effective tax rates ranging from a low of 30 
percent to a high of nearly 52 percent. The tax reductions resulting from multi- 
ple surtax exemptions range from a low of .4 percent to a high of 42 percent of 
the tax normally applicable in the absence of multiple exemptions. 
10. Several large enterprises split into several hundred corporations each. One corpo- 
ration divided into 4,000 smaller corporations. Id. Such a division would have enabled an 
enterprise to save over $2 million in taxes each year by taking advantage of over 4,000 
surtax exemptions. 
The tax benefits of multiple corporations have not been limited to the availability of 
surtax exemptions. For a review of other benefits that have motivated the use of the 
multiple corporate structure, see Geller, Tax and Non-Tax Motivation for the Creation 
and Utilization of Multiple Corporations, N.Y.U. 2 6 ~ ~  INST. ON FED. TAX. 649 (1968). 
11. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, Q 121(f), 65 Stat. 468-69, as amended, I.R.C. 6 1551: 
If any corporation transfers . . . property (other than money) to another 
corporation which was created for the purpose of acquiring such property or 
which was not actively engaged in business at the time of such acquisitions, and 
if after such transfer the transferor corporation or its stockholders . . . are in 
control of such transferee corporation. . . then such transferee corporation shall 
not for such taxable year . . . be allowed either the $25,000 exemption from 
surtax provided in Q ll(c) or the $60,000 accumulated earnings credit provided 
in paragraph (2) or (3) of Q 535(c), unless such transferee corporation shall 
establish by the clear preponderance of the evidence that the securing of such 
exemption or credit was not a major purpose of such transfer, . . . [Clontrol 
means the ownership of stock possessing at  least 80 percent of the total value of 
shares of all classes of stock of the corporation . . . . 
12. Two other statutory tools used to disallow additional exemptions were # 269 and 
Q 482. Section 269 provides that the Commissioner may disallow the exemption if a 
corporation acquires property solely for the purpose of avoiding or evading federal income 
tax. For examples of the application of Q 269 in this context, see Napsky v. Commissioner, 
371 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1967), and Kessmar Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 865 (9th 
Cir. 1964). Section 482 may not be used directly to disallow a surtax exemption. See 
Challenger, Inc., 23 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 2096, 2112-13 (1964). However, 8 482 authorizes 
the Secretary or his delegate to reallocate net income from one profitable corporation to 
another if he determines that such an allocation is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes. 
The effect of this reallocation may be the same as if the surtax exemption were disallowed. 
See Kessmar Constr. Co., 39 T.C. 778, 796 (1963) (dictum), aff'd, 336 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 
1964). 
13. The accumulated earnings credit increases the amount of earnings that a corpora- 
tion may accumulate without subjecting itself to the accumulated earnings tax. I.R.C. § 
535. See generally 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV. 812. 
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(other than money) to another corporation organized to receive 
the property.14 This section of the Code granted an exception to 
this rule if the transferor corporation could prove that securing 
the exemption or credit was not the primary purpose of the trans- 
fer. 
Section 1551 did not prove to be very effective in eliminating 
multiple surtax exemptions for three reasons. First, the statute 
only applied to transfers of property between corporations. It 
could therefore easily be circumvented by having the stockhold- 
ers rather than the corporation make the transfer to the newly 
created multiple corporations.15 Second, since the statute covered 
only direct transfers of property, a corporation could circumvent 
the statute with an indirect transfer? Third, corporations often 
met the burden of showing that their transfers were motivated by 
valid business reasons other than the securing of additional ex- 
empt ion~. '~  
2. Revenue Act of 1964 
In 1964 the Treasury Department attempted to persuade 
Congress to disallow multiple surtax exemptions to all related 
groups.18 Congress responded by enacting a new statutory 
scheme, sections 1561 to 1563,19 and by broadening the provisions 
of section 1551.20 
a. Sections 1561 to 1563. Sections 1561 and 1563 set forth 
14. The statutory language leaves the impression that the surtax exemption or accu- 
mulated earnings credit may be disallowed only in the year of transfer. Both judicial 
authority and the regulations indicate that the section may be used to disallow the exemp- 
tion in the year of transfer and in any subsequent year. See Beacon Auto Radiator Repair 
Co., 52 T.C. 155 (1969); Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-l(f) (1967). 
15. See Airlene Gas Co. v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 69,329, 69,332 (W.D. 
Ky. 1958). 
16. Id. For example, the transferor corporation would transfer money (not considered 
"property" under the statute) to the new corporation, which would then use the money 
to purchase property from the transferor corporation. 
17. See, e.g., Melvin Asphalt Prods. Corp. v. United States, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 
87,196, 87,197-98 (S.D. Ohio 1966). 
18. The impetus for change began with President Kennedy's 1963 tax message, in 
which he urged Congress to eliminate the tax advantage available to large corporate 
chains by limiting each affiliated corporate group to one surtax exemption. Hearings on 
the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Comrn. on Ways and Means, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, a t  14 (1963). The Treasury Department Proposal implemented the 
President's suggested reforms. Id. a t  36, 76-82, 158-83. 
19. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 116-25, as amended, 
I.R.C. $ 8  1561-63. 
20. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(b), 78 Stat. 125-27 (codified a t  
I.R.C. § 1551). 
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the general rule of this statutory scheme. Section 1561 limited 
members of a controlled group of corporations to one surtax ex- 
e m p t i ~ n . ~ '  The definition of a controlled group of corporations 
included both parent-subsidiaryz2 and brother-sister groups. Sec- 
tion 1563 defined a brother-sister group as a group of two or more 
corporations, if an individual, estate, or trust owned 80 percent 
or more of the voting power or total value of the stock of each 
corporation in the 
The new statute was substantially broader in application 
than section 1551 had been. Whereas section 1551 had required 
the Commissioner to show the existence of a transfer, subsequent 
control, and the formation of a new c o r p ~ r a t i o n , ~ ~  section 1561 
applied to all controlled groups, irrespective of these additional 
elements. And whereas the primary issue in section 1551 litiga- 
tion had been the taxpayer's motivation, section 1561 did not 
provide taxpayers the opportunity to prove that  nontax consider- 
ations motivated their choice of corporate structure. The mere 
fact of control brought them within the scope of the new provi- 
sions. 
Although sections 1561 and 1563 blocked the taxpayer's main 
escape routes under section 1551, section 1562 weakened the 
scheme by providing that a controlled group could elect to claim 
multiple exemptions at  a cost of an additional 6 percent tax on 
the corporation's first $25,000 of taxable income.25 This election 
provision effectively encouraged the use of the multiple surtax 
exemption.26 
b. Section 1551. The Tax Reform Act of 1964 also made 
major changes to section 1551. First, the addition of section 
l55l(a) (3) extended the application of section 1551 to indirect as 
well as direct transfers. Second, section 1551 was broadened to 
cover transfers made by "five or fewer individuals who are in 
21. Section 1561 also limited a controlled group to one accumulated earnings credit 
under § 535(c) (2)-(3) and one small business deduction under 0 6 8O4(a) (4), 8O9(d) (10). 
I.R.C. § 1561(a)(2)-(3). 
22. I.R.C. 0 1563(a)(l). As parent-subsidiary groups are beyond the scope of this case 
note, the use of the term "controlled group" will refer only to brother-sister groups unless 
otherwise indicated. 
23. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 8 235(a), 78 Stat. 120, as amended, 
I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2). 
24. See note 11 supra. 
25. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 0 235(a), 78 Stat. 117-20, as amended, 
I.R.C. 5 1562. 
26. A corporation with a taxable income of more than $32,500 could pay the 6% 
additional tax and still benefit from the use of the multiple surtax exemption. 
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control of a c~rporation."~' With respect to such transfers, section 
1551(b) defined control of a corporation as 
(2) . . . the ownership by the five or fewer individuals 
[who transfer property] of stock possessing- 
(A) a t  least 80 percent of the total combined vot- 
ing power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or a t  
least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes 
of the stock of each corporation, and 
(B) more than 50 percent of the total combined 
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or 
more than 50 percent of the total value of shares of all 
classes of stock of each corporation, taking into account 
the stock ownership of each such individual only to the 
extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to 
each such c o r p o r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
As enacted, the 80-percent and 50-percent tests contained an 
ambiguity. The language of the tests did not specify whether the 
stock ownership of someone who did not own stock in all the 
corporations (and therefore was not figured in the 50-percent test) 
could be counted for purposes of the 80-percent test. Treasury 
regulations issued in 196729 did not effectively deal with this issue 
and thus left the question u n r e s ~ l v e d . ~ ~  
3. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 
The subject of multiple surtax exemptions came before Con- 
gress again in connection with the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Con- 
gress amended section 1563 by adding a broader definition of 
control.31 The new definition used the identical language that had 
been added to the section 1551 control requirement in 1964." The 
legislative history of the new amendment made clear that its 
purpose was to eliminate surtax exemption advantages for large 
enterprises having multi-corporate  structure^.^^ 
- - 
27. I.R.C. 5 1551(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
28. Id. 5 1551(b)(2). For illustrations of the application of the 80-percent and 50- 
percent tests, see note 2 supra. 
29. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1551-1 (1967). 
30. See White, The New Broader Sweep of Section 1551: An Analysis of IRSJ 
Regulations, 28 J .  TAX. 100, 101 (1968). 
31. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 5 401(c), 83 Stat. 487 (codified at 
I.R.C. $ 1563(a)). 
32. See text accompanying note 28 supra. 
33. STAFFS OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION AND SENATE COMM. ON 
FINANCE, 9 1 s ~  CONG.,  ST SESS., SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 
(As PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) 56-57 (Comm. Print 1969): 
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Once again, the language defining control provoked ques- 
tions of whether the stock ownership of individuals who did not 
own stock in every corporation could be counted to satisfy the 80- 
percent test.34 In 1971, the Treasury Department issued a tempo- 
rary regulation (now a final regulation) dealing directly with this 
question," which defines a brother-sister controlled group as "two 
or more corporations if the same five or fewer persons who are 
individuals, estates, or trusts own . . ,  singly or in combina- 
tion, stock [sufficient to satisfy the 80-percent and 50-percent 
tests]."36 The first example following the regulation illustrates 
the meaning of singly or i n  combination: 
Example (1). The outstanding stock of corporations P, Q, 
R, S, and T, which have only one class of stock outstanding, is 
owned by the following unrelated individuals: 
Corporations Identical 
Indi- Owner- 
viduals P Q R S T ship 
.A . . . . . . . . . .  60'h G O ' h  60'k.t 6 0 %  100Yc 60 % 
B . . . . . . . . .  40% . . 
. . .  C . . . . . . . . . . . .  40% . . .  . . 
. . .  D . . . . . . . . . . . .  4OCk . . 
E . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . .  40 r/o 
-- 
Total . . . . . . .  100% loo(/, 100'/0 l0Ock 100% 60 ',4 
Corporations P, Q, R, S? and T a re  meinbers of a b ro the r - s i s t e~  controlled 
o'soUP.:: 7 
(1) Large economic units have been able to reap unintended tax benefits 
through the use of multiple corporations. Often the only reason for using multi- 
ple corporations is to take advantage of the surtax exemption or the $100,000 
accumulated earnings credit. This may lead to uneconomic practice and a great 
waste of energy by taxpayers, their counsel, and the Internal Revenue Service. 
By structuring a large economic unit so as to generate no more than $25,000 of 
taxable income in each component corporation, the maximum marginal tax can 
be held a t  28 percent instead of 48 percent, thus, avoiding tax of $5,000 for each 
corporation. 
(2) Even where there are good business reasons for using multiple but 
related corporations they still should not be given the tax benefits designed for 
small business. 
(3) This provision will prevent the artificial incorporation of many compa- 
nies that actually perform the same or similar operations under one manage- 
ment. 
(4) Under the present law, large businesses, such as various chain stores, 
are able to take advantage of the multiple surtax exemption while competing 
smaller businesses in local communities are not. This presents an element of 
unfair competition which the bill eliminates. 
34. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. One commentator states that "[a] 
consensus indicates that a controlled group does, in fact, exist" even if all individual 
owners do not own stock in each member corporation. Shapiro, New Multiple Corporation 
Surtax Exemption Rules, N.Y.U. 2 9 ~ ~  INST. ON FED. TAX. 567, 573 n.4 (1971). Other 
commentators suggest that the consensus is that a controlled group should not exist. See 
note 38 infra. 
35. Temporary Treas. Reg. # 13.16-l(a), T.D. 7101, 1971-1 C.B. 269. 
36. Treas. Reg. O 1.1563-l(a)(3)(i) (1972) (emphasis added). 
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The thrust of the regulation is to include, for purposes of the 80- 
percent test, the stock ownership of individuals who do not own 
stock in each corporation and are therefore not counted for the 
50-percent test (in the above example, individuals B, C, D, and 
E) 
Commentators attacked this temporary regulation as misin- 
terpreting the language of section 1563 and its legislative his- 
tory.3R Nevertheless, when the Treasury issued proposedm and 
final regulation section 1.1563-1 (a) (3) the wording remained the 
same. This regulation has been repeatedly criti~ized;~' but, until 
the instant case, it has never been tested j u d i ~ i a l l y . ~ ~  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained Treasury reg- 
ulation section l.l563-l(a) (3)' reversing per curium the Tax 
Court's holding that a person must own stock in each member of 
the brother-sister controlled group in order for his stock to be 
counted for purposes of the 80-percent ownership test. Conse- 
quently, Joseph Ofano's 45 percent stock ownership in FAP must 
be counted for purposes of the 80-percent test, even though he 
owned no stock in NOVA.43 Although William Herbert's owner- 
ship alone did not satisfy the test,44 counting Joseph Ofano's own- 
ership in FAP resulted in NOVA and FAP being members of a 
brother-sister controlled group. The two corporations were thus 
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-l(a)(3)(ii) Ex. 1 (1972). 
38. See Libin & Abramowitz, Multiple Corporations: A Surprising Interpretation of 
Sec. 1563(a)(2) in Temporary Regulations, 2 TAX ADVISER 326 (1971). 
39. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-l(a)(3), 36 Fed. Reg. 17,869 (1971). 
40. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1972). 
41. See, e.g., Bonovitz, Brother-Sister Controlled Groups Under Section 1563: The 
80 Percent Ownership Test, 28 TAX LAW. 511 (1975); Thomas, Brother-Sister Multiple 
Corporations-The Tax Reform Act of 1969 Reformed by Regulation, 28 TAX L. REV. 65 
(1972). 
42. Following the instant case, this issue was again raised in a Tax Court memoran- 
dum decision, which followed the rationale of the instant case in holding the regulations 
invalid. T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) 966 (1976), appeal 
docketed No. 76-1894 (8th Cir. Oct. 18, 1976). 
43. Contra, Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 802-07 
(1976), rev 'd per curiam, [I977 Adv. Sh.] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) (77-1 U S .  Tax 
Cas. 86,250) T[ 9163 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1977). 
44. William Herbert's stock ownership satisfied the 50-percent test, but because he 
held only 55% of NOVA'S stock, his ownership did not satisfy the 80-percent test. 
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entitled to only one full surtax exemption for each year in dis- 
p ~ t e . ~ ~  
The Tax Court had based its decision on an analysis of the 
statutory language and legislative history of sections 1561 to 1563, 
reasoning that neither the plain language of the statute nor the 
clear thrust of the congressional committee reports and hearings 
supported the Commissioner's in te rp re ta t i~n .~~  The Tax Court 
had further argued that sustaining the regulation would render 
the 80-percent test meaningless, since the test's basic function is 
to measure the financial interest of those individuals satisfying 
the 50-percent control test.47 Finally, the Tax Court majority had 
ruled that Treasury regulation section 1.1551-1 did not represent 
a viable interpretation of section 1563(a)(2), since the definition 
of control under section 1551 varies according to whether a corpo- 
ration is the transferee or transferor. Since the Commissioner had 
not provided a method for determining whether FAP or NOVA 
was the transferor, the Tax Court determined that section 1551 
was not a p p l i ~ a b l e . ~ ~  
The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected the Tax Court major- 
ity's rationale and relied upon the dissenting opinion's reasoning 
to uphold the contested regulation. The Tax Court dissent set 
forth three principal arguments. First, the language and legisla- 
tive history of section 1563 support the Treasury interpretation 
embodied in the regulation. This conclusion represented a rein- 
terpretation of much of the same language cited by the Tax Court 
majority.49 Second, Congress impliedly approved the contested 
regulation when in 1974 it incorporated the regulation's definition 
of a brother-sister controlled group into the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Third, Example (4) of regulation section 
45. Contm, 65 T.C. a t  807. 
46. Id. a t  802-05. 
47. Id. a t  805-06. 
48. Id. a t  806-07. 
49. Id. a t  808-10. 
50. I.R.C. § 414(b). The doctrine of statutory reenactment is based on the presump- 
tion that when Congress reenacts a statute, it has knowledge of the current interpretation 
being given the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931). For 
interesting commentary on the rule of statutory reenactment, see Brown, Regulations, 
Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1941); Feller, Addendum to 
the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1311 (1941); Griswold, A Summary of the 
Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 398 (1941); Griswold, Postscriptum, 54 HARV. L. 
REV. 1323 (1941). 
In the Tax Court case, the dissenters argued that when Congress incorporated by 
reference § 1563 into 8 414(b) of the Code, it impliedly approved the interpretation of 
§ 1563 given by the regulations. This argument has three potential weaknesses. First, the 
assumption that Congress is aware of the current interpretation of a statute may have less 
basis when Congress is using a statute by reference than when it is reenacting the statute 
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1.1551-l(g)(4) illustrates the proper interpretation that should be 
given the stock ownership test of section 1563."' The dissent inter- 
preted Example (4) to indicate that the stock ownership of an 
individual may be considered for the 80-percent test even though 
the individual does not own stock in the transferee corp~ra t ion .~~  
Since the Fourth Circuit opinion merely incorporates by ref- 
erence the analyses of the Tax Court majority and dissent (finally 
accepting the dissent's analysis), this note will focus on the lower 
court opinion. This note does not, however, analyze the lower 
court's treatment of the language and legislative history of section 
1563. Rather, it focuses on the stock ownership test of section 
1551, and examines the dissent's argument that section 1551 is 
relevant to a proper analysis of the section 1563 ownership test. 
Further, it analyzes the statutory language, legislative history, 
and regulations defining the section 1551 stock ownership test. 
Finally, the note examines the portion of the legislative history, 
not treated by the Tax Court, that requires the adoption of the 
stock ownership test of section 1551 into section 1563. 
The narrow scope of this analysis seems justified when 
viewed in light of the standard that must be met to overturn 
regulations. The Fourth Circuit refused to overturn regulation 
section 1.1563-1(a)(3) because the Tax Court dissent was able to 
construct a persuasive argument in support of the regulation 
based on the same language used by the Tax Court majority to 
support its position that the regulation is invalid.53 The regulation 
itself. In this instance, since Congress' attention was focused primarily on the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act, it may not have reexamined the interpretation being 
given § 1563. Second, regulation § 1.1563-1(a)(3) is relatively new and may not have come 
to the attention of Congress. See United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1957) 
(no evidence that Congress was aware of statute, 3-year-old statute didn't create such a 
presumption). Third, the uncertain interpretation of § 1563 may render the doctrine 
inapplicable. See Fred W. Smith, 25 T.C. 143, 146-47 (1955). 
51. See note 68 and accompanying text infra. 
52. 65 T.C. at 810. 
53. See note 4 supra. 
"Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsist- 
ent with the revenue statutes . . . ." Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 
496, 501 (1948). Merely showing, as did the Tax Court, that an alternative interpretation 
of the statute has greater logic than the regulation is insufficient grounds for overturning 
the regulation. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967). The dissent's 
success in constructing an argument in favor of regulation § 1.1563-1(a)(3) based on the 
text and legislative history of § 1563 was probably the major factor influencing the Fourth 
Circuit's reversal. The regulation, however, must also accord with the stock ownership test 
of § 1551(b)(2). See note 54 and accompanying text infra. 
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must withstand another test, however. Since Congress intended 
the stock ownership test of section 1563 to be "the same test 
employed in section 1551 (b) (2) of the code, "54 regulation section 
1.1563-l(a)(3) must also accord with the stock ownership test of 
section l55l(b) (2). The following analysis of section 1551, there- 
fore, will provide an independent measure of the reasonableness 
and consistency of regulation section 1.1563- 1(a) (3). 
A. The  Lower Court Dissent's Interpretation of Section 1551 
The dissenting opinion of the Tax Court reasoned that 
NOVA and FAP would constitute a brother-sister controlled 
group under the stock ownership test of section 1551(b)(2). The 
dissent argued that Example (4) of regulation section 1.1551- 
l(g)(4) requires this result. The Tax Court majority acknowl- 
edged that under this interpretation of the example NOVA and 
FAP would constitute a brother-sister controlled group, but only 
if NOVA were deemed the transferor corporation. The Tax Court 
then stated that the dissent's interpretation of section 1551(b)(2) 
was not a proper interpretation of section l563(a) (2) "[s]ince 
respondent [Commissioner] has pointed to no method of deter- 
mining which corporation is to be regarded as the transferor 
. . . .  
"55 
The dissent's argument is pervasive on its face because, 
as previously noted,56 the legislative history of section 1563 ex- 
plicitly requires the adoption of the ownership test of section 
1551(b)(2). If the dissent correctly analyzed Example (4) of regu- 
lation section 1.1551-1(g)(4), i t  is clearly relevant, and the Tax 
Court majority merely sidestepped the issue. If, however, the 
dissent's interpretation was not correct, the Tax Court missed an 
opportunity to strengthen its opinion by exposing the fallacy. It 
is clear from the following analysis of section 1551, its legislative 
history, and its regulations, that the dissent misinterpreted the 
relevance of Example (4) and hence misconstrued the ownership 
test of section 1551. Moreover, analysis of section 1551 reveals 
that regulation section 1.1563-1 (a) (3) does not accord with the 
ownership test of section 1551. The Fourth Circuit's reliance upon 
the dissent was therefore misplaced. 
54. H.R. REP. NO. 413,91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1969); S. REP. NO. 552,91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1969). This language likely originated with the Treasury Tax Reform 
Proposal: "This definition [of a brother-sister controlled group] is the same as that under 
section 1551 . . . ." HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS & SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 9 1 s ~  
CONG.,  ST SESS., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, pt. 2, at 252 
(Comm. Print 1969). 
55. 65 T.C. at 807. 
56. See note 54 and accompanying text supra. 
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B. T h e  Stock Ownership Rule Under Section 1551 
1. - T h e  language of section 1551 
In order for section 1551 to apply, the following three condi- 
tions must be satisfied: (1) there must be "five or fewer indivi- 
duals who are in control of a corporation;" (2) these individuals 
must "transfer . . . property . . . to a transferee corporation;" 
and (3) "the transferor or transferors [must be] in control of such 
transferee corporation . . . . "57 
The language of section 1551 never explicitly states that the 
"five or fewer individuals" who control the transferor corporation 
must constitute the same group comprising the "transferor or 
transferors" who must control the transferee corporation. The 
Tax Court dissent interprets the language to mean that not all 
of those who control the transferor corporation need to control 
the transferee corporation to invoke the penalty of section 1551. 
This argument suggests that the transferor or transferors com- 
prise a subgroup of the five or fewer individuals, with not all 
members of the five or fewer individuals necessarily belonging to 
the subgroup. 
Although not stated in its opinion, the Tax Court majority 
position is consistent with the interpretation of the statute that 
the five or fewer individuals and the transferor or transferors are 
one and the same. Consequently, the stock ownership of an indi- 
vidual owning stock in the original corporation may not be 
counted to fulfill the percentage tests unless he owns stock in the 
transferee corporation as well. A careful reading of the language 
introducing the section 1551 stock ownership test supports this 
interpretation: "With respect to each corporation [the original 
corporation and the transferee corporation] . . . [control 
means] the ownership by the  five or fewer individuals . . . [who 
satisfy the 80-percent and 50-percent tests] ."" This language 
states that the five or fewer individuals must satisfy the owner- 
ship tests with respect to each corporation. Taken in conjunction 
with the requirement that the transferor or transferors control the 
transferee corporation, it seems clear that the five or fewer indi- 
viduals and the transferor or transferors must be the same indi- 
viduals. Since the same ownership test must be met with respect 
to both the transferor and transferee corporations by the same 
individuals, it would violate the statutory language to consider 
57. I.R.C. § 1551(a) (emphasis added). 
58. I.R.C. § 1551(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
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for purposes of the ownership tests the stock ownership of some- 
one who does not own stock in both corporations. The legislative 
history of section 1551(b)(2) also supports this interpretation. 
2. Legislative history of section 1551 (b)(2) 
The legislative explanation of section 1551(b) (2) reads: 
[Flor purposes of determining whether the transferor is consid- 
ered to be in control of the transferee corporation, the individual 
who makes the transfer, together with no more than four other 
individuals, must own at  least 80 percent of the value or voting 
power of the stock in two or more corporations, one of which is 
the transferee corporation, and the same individuals must own 
more than 50 percent of the value or voting power of the stock 
in each corporation (only taking into account identical stock- 
holdings) after the transfer.59 
Congress clearly intended the same individuals who satisfy the 
50-percent test to satisfy together the 80-percent test with respect 
to both corporations. An example following the legislative explan- 
ation illustrates this principle: 
Individuals 
Corporations 
X Y 
The example concludes that both the 80-percent and 50-percent 
tests are met.60 Had Congress intended the test to be satisfied 
even if B owned stock in only X or Y, it is reasonable to assume 
that it would have chosen an example to illustrate this broader 
application of section 1551(b)(2). Since it did not use such an 
example, Congress apparently contemplated B's ownership in 
both corporations. 
The Technical Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1963 in the 
House Committee Report on section 1551(b)(2) also supports a 
narrow interpretation of the statutory language: 
Paragraph (2) of Section 1551(b) provides that five or fewer 
individuals are in control if such individuals own- 
59. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, SENATE COMM. ON 
FINANCE, 8 8 ~ ~  CONG., ST SESS., STAFF DESCRIPTION F H.R. 8363, THE REVENUE ACT OF 
1963, As PASSED BY THE U S .  HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 120 (Comm. Print 1963); H.R. 
REP. NO. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1963); S .  REP. NO. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 155 
(1964) (emphasis added). 
60. STAFF ON THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, SENATE COMM. ON 
FINANCE, 8 8 ~ ~  CONG., ST SESS., supra note 59, at 120-21. 
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(A) at  least 80 percent . . . of (i) the transferee 
corporation, and (ii) a t  least one corporation which such 
individual (or individuals) controlled . . . before the 
transfer, and 
(B) more than 50 percent . . . of e a c h  s u c h  
corporation, taking into account the stock ownership of 
each such individual only to the extent such stock own- 
ership is identical with respect to each such corpora- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  
The conjunctive subject "such individuals" clearly refers to "five 
or fewer individuals." Such individuals must own 80 percent of 
the stock of the transferee corporation and the corporation that 
such individuals controlled before the transfer. Such individuals 
must also satisfy the 50-percent test with respect to "each such 
corporation." The explanation implies that each of the individu- 
als must own stock in both corporations. 
The example given in the Technical Explanation also sup- 
ports this interpretation. The example illustrates the stock own- 
ership of individuals A and B following a transfer: 
Individual 
Corporations 
- - 
X Y 
These individuals satisfy the 80-percent test "since the same five 
or fewer individuals (A and B) own more than 80 percent of the 
stock of corporations X and Y as required under section 
1551(b)(Z)(A) . . . . "62 
3. Treasury regulations under section 1551 
Regulation section 1.1551-1 provides the Treasury's interpre- 
tation of section 1551.63 
a. Control. Subsection (e) of the regulation, entitled 
"Meaning and application of the  term 'control', " contains a defi- 
nition of control similar to tha t  in regulation section 1.1563- 
1 (a) (3) ." One significant difference, however, is that regulation 
section 1.1551-l(e) does not use the words "singly or in combina- 
tion, " as does regulation section 1.1563-1 (a) (3). The general defi- 
61. H.R. REP. NO. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. A212 (1963) (emphasis added). 
62. Id. at A212-13. 
63. See I.R.C. 9 7805. 
64. See text accompanying note 36 supra. 
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nition of control in subparagraph l(e) is followed by the illustra- 
tive example set out below: 
Example. On January 1, 1964, individual A, who owns 50 
percent of the voting stock of corporation X, and individual B, 
who owns 30 percent of such voting stock, transfer property 
(other than money) to corporation Y (newly created for the pur- 
pose of acquiring such property) in exchange for all of Y's voting 
stock. After the transfer, A and B own the voting stock of corpo- 
rations X and Y in the following proportions: 
Corpora- Corpora- Identical 
Individual tion X tion Y 0,wnership 
A . . . . . . . .  - 5 0  30 30 
B . . . . . . . .  30 50 
- - 
30 
- 
Total 80 80 60 
The transfer of property by A and B to corporation Y is a trans- 
fer described in [regulation section 1.1551-1 (a) (3)] since (i) A 
and B own at  least 80 percent of the voting stock of corporations 
X and Y, and (ii) taking into account each such individual's 
stock ownership only to the extent such ownership is identical 
with respect to each such corporation, A and B own more than 
50 percent of the voting stock of corporations X and Y.65 
The fact that the example shows A and B owning stock in 
both X and Y is evidence of the Treasury's intent to limit section 
1551 to common control under the 80-percent test. Since the regu- 
lations state the Treasury's interpretation of the Code, the courts 
are reluctant to sustain any subsequent Treasury interpretation 
of the Code that is broader than the  regulation^.^' Therefore, if 
the Treasury were to adopt a broad interpretation of control (e.g., 
that B need not own stock in both X and Y), regulation section 
1.1551-l(e) would seemingly be the source of the interpretation. 
The example used by the Tax Court dissent to substantiate its 
interpretation of control, however, is not found in regulation sec- 
tion 1.1551-l(e). Rather, the example comes from subsection (g) 
of the same regulation, which deals with transfer. 
b. Transfer. Regulation section 1.1551-l(g), entitled 
"Nature of transfer, " expresses the Treasury's interpretation of 
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-1(e)(3) (1967). 
66. See Miller v. Commissioner, 333 F.2d 400, 402-03 (8th Cir. 1964); McCord v. 
Granger, 201 F.2d 103,106-07 (3d Cir. 1952); Pacific Nat'l. Bank v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 
103, 105 (9th Cir. 1937). 
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the transfer requirement of section 1551. Paragraph (3) states: 
"[Ilf one of five or fewer individuals who are in control of a 
corporation transfers property (other than money) to a controlled 
transferee corporation, the transfer is within the scope of section 
1551(a)(3) notwithstanding that the other individuals transfer 
nothing or transfer only money."67 This paragraph illustrates that 
to constitute a transfer under section 1551(a)(3), all members of 
the ownership group need not transfer property. The paragraph 
extends the definition of a transfer to cover situations where some 
members of the ownership group are not involved in a transfer but 
nevertheless own stock in the transferee corporation. 
Paragraph (3) is illustrated by Example (4): . 
Example (4). Individual A owns 55 percent of the stock of 
corporation X. Another 25 percent of corporation X's stock is 
owned in the aggregate by individuals B, C, D, and E. On June 
15, 1963, individual A transfers property to corporation Y (newly 
created for the purpose of acquiring such property) in exchange 
for 60 percent of the stock of Y, and B, C, and D acquire all of 
the remaining stock of Y. The transfer is within the scope of 
section l55l(a) (3) .68 
The example illustrates that even though B, C, D, and E did not 
transfer property to Y, the transfer requirement of section 
1551(a)(3) has been met. Transfer, however, is only one require- 
ment of section 1551F TO determine if the control test has been 
met, section 1551(b)(2) and regulation section 1.1551-l(e) must 
be consulted. Based on their requirements, the same ownership 
group would not control corporations X and Y, because E owns 
no stock in Y corp~rat ion.~~ Therefore, the penalty provision of 
section 1551 would not apply.71 
c. The Tax Court dissent's improper use of Example (4). 
The dissent's interpretation of the stock ownership test of section 
1551(b)(2) was based on the erroneous premise that Example (4) 
of regulation section 1.1551-1 (g) (4) illustrates the control require- 
ment of section 1551. Instead, as explained above, the example 
illustrates the transfer requirement. A separate subsection of the 
regulations is devoted exclusively to the element of control.72 The 
67. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1551-1(g)(3) (1967). 
68. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1551-1(g)(4) Ex. 4 (1967). 
69. For the other requirements, see I.R.C. 5 1551(a). 
70. See text accompanying note 64-65 supra. 
71. It is difficult to understand why the drafters of the regulations would include an 
example of the transfer requirement that does not also comply with the other requirements 
of the section. Perhaps this inconsistency is due to oversight. 
72. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1563-l(a)(3). See note 64 and accompanying text supra. 
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text and illustrating example of this subsection do not support 
the interpretation suggested by the dissent.73 
C. Incorporating Section 1551 into Section 1563 
Neither the language nor the legislative history of section 
1563 makes any reference to the terms "transferor" or "trans- 
feree." The Tax Court dissent's explanation of the ownership test 
under section 1551, however, is meaningful only if corporations 
are characterized as either transferee or transferor corporations, 
since the stock ownership test would apply differently with re- 
spect to each.74 But since section 1563 provides for only a single 
test of ownership to be applied with respect to all  corporation^,'^ 
the determination of the transferor and transferee clearly has no 
relevance to section 1563. Thus, the dissent's interpretation of 
control renders meaningless the language of the House Report 
that the "stock ownership test [of section 15631 would be the 
same test employed in section 1551(b)(2) of the Code."76 
The Tax Court majority's explanation, however, is not de- 
pendent upon characterizing a corporation as either transferee or 
transferor. The control test applies identically with respect to 
each. Thus, the Tax Court's interpretation preserves the plain 
meaning of the House Report. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' reliance upon the Tax 
Court dissenting opinion's analysis was misplaced. Although on 
their face the dissent's arguments appear pursuasive, an analysis 
of the language, legislative history, and regulations of section 
1551 does not support the dissent's interpretation. Further, the 
legislative history requiring the adoption of the ownership test 
of section 1551 into section 1563 is meaningful only under the 
Tax Court interpretation. In light of the foregoing, regulation 
73. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra. 
74. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1551-1(g)(4) Ex. 4 (1967) illustrates a transferee corporation, of 
which individuals A, B, C, and D own 80%. The transferor corporation is owned by 
individuals A, B, C, D, and E. Thus the example may be interpreted to support the 
proposition that a subgroup (A, B, C, and D) of the transferor corporation's ownership 
group may own the transferee corporation and still satisfy the control tests. However, the 
example offers no support for the reverse proposition. For an interesting discussion of this 
issue, see Bonovitz, supra note 41, at 528. 
75. See note 2 supra. 
76. H.R. REP. NO. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1969); S. REP. NO. 552,91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1969). 
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section 1.1563-l(a)(3) is clearly an inconsistent and unreason- 
able interpretation of section 1563 and should not have been 
sustained on appeal. 
